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Abstract: Although scholars increasingly recognize that people often possess multiple and even
conflicting attitudes about a given topic, our understanding of the nature, causes, and
consequences of such attitudinal ambivalence is limited by a lack of consensus as to how the
concept should be operationalized. In this paper, we examine three separate measures (one
subjective, two operative) of ambivalence regarding "the federal government in Washington"
that were asked in the 2006 ANES Pilot Study. Our findings indicate that while the operative
measures are less susceptible to question-order and response-order effects, none of the three
indicators fares particularly well in various other tests of construct validity.
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Conflict is the root of politics. Often, when we think about political conflict, what comes
to mind are the issues that divide northerners from southerners, haves from have-nots, moralists
from secularists, minorities from majorities, and women from men. After all, as James Madison
reminded us in Federalist 10, differences in interests, abilities, and lifestyles that give rise to
conflicts between people are "sown in the nature of man." Conflict, however, also exists within
individuals' own thought processes. Poor people are more likely than rich people to see and to
value the societal advantages that accrue from social welfare policies, yet many among the ranks
of rich and poor alike might value both economic opportunity and a tightly woven social safety
net. Environmentalists are more likely than local developers to prefer conservation measures to
unbridled economic growth, but each side (and especially those on neither side) might see a mix
of benefits and drawbacks to the regulation of property by government. Even on the culturally
divisive issue of abortion, many Americans feel torn between two "rights" – that of the woman
trying to decide whether to abort, and that of the fetus whose fate rests with her decision.
As obvious as it may be that such conflicted feelings do exist, for many years researchers
in both social psychology and political science (see Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Zaller and Feldman
1992) generally conceptualized attitudes as being unidimensional. Thurstone's (1928; Thurstone
and Chave 1929) seminal work on attitude measurement, for example, characterized attitudes as
bipolar, ranging from positive (or favorable) to negative (or unfavorable), with a neutral point in
between. In his review of attitude research, Allport (1935) even suggested that the bipolarity of
attitudes (favorable vs. unfavorable) were their most distinct feature. This seemed to make
perfect sense because on most issues people undoubtedly do think in bipolar terms. They either
like something or they don't, support a policy/party/candidate or oppose it. Similarly, in political
commentary, political leaders are described as being either "liberal" or "conservative" (or perhaps
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"middle-of-the-road") – and, depending on their own predispositions, voters are thought to react
accordingly, i.e., positively or negatively, but probably not both at the same time. Research over
the years, though, has made it clear that the unidimensional model does not capture the entire
story.
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Psychologists and political scientists have increasingly come to embrace the idea that
people do not always have a single "true" attitude about a particular topic, but rather a store of
multiple and sometimes contradictory attitudes that they might draw upon when answering
questions in an opinion survey, deciding which candidate to vote for in an election, or otherwise
choosing from among alternative scenarios or courses of action (Zaller and Feldman 1992; also
see Zaller 1992). When someone's evaluations, beliefs, or emotions concerning an attitude object
are in conflict with one another, we might describe that person as being ambivalent (Alvarez and
Brehm 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Martinez, Craig, and Kane 2005). Defining ambivalence
2

is one thing, however, while measuring it is quite another. As the concept received greater
attention in recent years, scholars began to develop and test a variety of different approaches.
Whereas some of these are indirect and inferential (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Alvarez and Brehm
1995, 2002), there have been numerous attempts to measure individual-level ambivalence
directly using both objective (Kaplan 1972; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995) and subjective
(Priester and Petty 1996; Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, and D'Andrade 1989; Holbrook and
Krosnick 2005) indicators. The present study focuses on individuals, comparing the construct
validity of objective (or operative) and subjective (or meta-attitudinal) measures of ambivalence
toward government that were included in the 2006 ANES Pilot Study.

3

Measuring Ambivalence toward Government
One of the most dramatic trends in American public opinion over the past half century
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involves the loss of public confidence in government (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Pew
Center for the People and the Press 2006; Keele 2007). Although there is no consensus regarding
the precise origins and meaning of this trend, it seems clear that at least part of the explanation is
performance-based, i.e., with many people expressing dissatisfaction because they don't believe
that governmental leaders and institutions have dealt effectively with important problems facing
the nation (Citrin and Luks 2001; Stimson 2004; Hetherington 2005). Other factors undoubtedly
matter as well (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Keele 2007), but our interest here lies with the
possibility that the relationship between rulers and ruled may not be quite as precarious as it
appears to be at first glance. Some scholars maintain that a lack of confidence in government
should be viewed as the norm in American politics and, consequently, that the long-term decline
is less in need of explanation than are the higher trust levels observed in the early 1960s and the
periodic spikes that occur during periods of war or national crisis (Alford 2001). Others have
suggested that the most frequently employed indicators of concepts such as political trust are
measuring traditional American skepticism about government rather than active mistrust, and that
only the latter – which probably has not changed much in recent years – is likely to have serious
consequences for governability or system stability (Cook and Gronke 2005; Craig, Gainous, and
Martinez 2006).
Alternatively, perhaps it is ambivalence more than skepticism that characterizes citizens'
attitudes about government today. Students of public opinion during the Truman-Eisenhower era
often described the public as being of two minds in their attitudes about government. Hyman and
Sheatsley (1954; also see Mitchell 1959), for example, reported that ambivalence was evident in
the fact that many people criticized almost any government agency they were asked about while
simultaneously expressing great pride in officeholders and institutions, and opposed government
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interference with business while nonetheless expecting elected leaders to solve pressing social
problems.
More recently, McGraw and Bartels (2005) examined ANES data to determine whether
citizens exhibited inconsistency (or conflict) in their evaluations of Congress, President Clinton,
and the Supreme Court with regard to four characteristics: doesn't get much accomplished, too
involved in partisan politics, doesn't care what ordinary people think, and corrupt. They found
that cognitive ambivalence toward each of the three branches of the national government was
fairly common during the late 1990s, but that ambivalence in one instance did not necessarily
imply ambivalence across the board (correlations between the different sets of indicators ranged
from moderate to nonexistent). In a survey of registered voters in Florida, Craig, Gainous, and
Martinez (2006) found that most respondents experienced some degree of affective ambivalence
toward the three levels of government in the United States (national, state, local); their analysis
also indicated that those who were ambivalent toward one level tended to be ambivalent toward
others as well (though the relationships were of fairly modest magnitude), and that ambivalence
and political trust were unrelated, i.e., the former was as common among individuals with a
positive view of government as it was among those whose outlook was more critical.
Our understanding of the nature, causes, and consequences of attitudinal ambivalence is
limited, however, by a difference of opinion among scholars as to how the concept should be
operationalized. In particular, prior research suggests that attributes of attitudes (of which
ambivalence is one, along with importance, strength, commitment, and others) can be measured
in surveys either subjectively, by asking respondents to "self-diagnose" their own attitude state, or
4

operatively, by asking questions designed to reveal symptoms of the attitude state (Bassili 1996).

A subjective approach is attractive largely because of its simplicity. Asking respondents how
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certain they are, or how conflicted they feel, about an attitude they have just expressed is easy to
do; such questions are usually quick to administer, they yield a direct and pre-coded measure of
the attitude attribute, and they help to maintain the "flow" of conversation between interviewer
and respondent. Especially from the perspective of survey design, there is much to recommend
the use of subjective measures of ambivalence.
Subjective measures may fail, however, if interviewers are asking respondents to tell us
more than they can actually know. Although well-designed surveys should enable people to more
or less accurately report on their thoughts and feelings, respondents often miss the mark when
they try to describe the psychological attributes of those thoughts and feelings or the mental
processes that led to them (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). In the case of ambivalence, self-reports are
accurate only if people recognize attitude conflict, store the perception or experience of conflict
in long-term memory, and are able to retrieve that perception when forming a response to the
survey question about conflict. Unfortunately, even if attitude attributes are not well-represented
in memory, subjective measures may still generate reports of "non-attributes" from individuals
who search for clues (heuristics) from the survey context that can help them provide answers to
questions and thereby keep the "conversation" going (Bassili 1996: 638-639). Consequently,
while subjective measures of ambivalence are relatively easy to administer, there is reason to
doubt that they are actually measuring what they intend to measure.
In contrast, operative measures of ambivalence are based on questions that reveal trace
evidence of attitude conflict. Following a procedure outlined by Thompson, Zanna and Griffin
(1995), our measurement strategy in a series of prior studies has been to ask respondents for their
separate positive and negative feelings about an issue (Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002; Craig,
Martinez, Kane, and Gainous 2005; Gainous and Martinez 2005) and to regard those who offered
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a mix of both as ambivalent. While this approach is consistent with the standard conception of
ambivalence, asking people to provide separate favorable and unfavorable evaluations about
multiple attitude objects in a single survey can be cumbersome, tedious, and expensive. Scholars
also have utilized other operative measures, of varying degrees of complexity; some of these are
based, for example, on open-ended likes/dislikes of parties and candidates (Lavine 2001;
Basinger and Lavine 2005), social group feeling thermometers (Lavine and Steenbergen 2005),
and responses to closed-ended questions that tap respondents' political values (Rudolph 2005),
policy positions (Cantril and Cantril 1999), emotional states (Citrin and Luks 2005), and the traits
they ascribe to political leaders and institutions (McGraw and Bartels 2005).
Our objective in this paper is to assess the validity of three measures of ambivalence, two
operative and one subjective. We do so by determining, first, the extent to which the different
measures are more or less resistant to context (question order and wording) effects within the
survey; and, second, whether they moderate either the stability of attitudes over time (Craig,
Martinez, and Kane 2005; Armitage and Connor 2000; Bassili 1996) or the impact of an attitude
on other attitudes and behavior (Armitage and Connor 2000; Craig, Martinez, Kane, and Gainous
2005). In addition, we examine the relationship between the three measures of ambivalence and
three other theoretically relevant variables: political interest, party identification, and support for
divided government.
Data and Questions
5

As noted above, the 2006 ANES Pilot Study included one "self-diagnosis" and two sets
of questions that were used construct operative measures of ambivalence regarding the federal
government. The subjective (or meta-ambivalence; see Holbrook and Krosnick 2005) item is
worded as follows:
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"How conflicting are your thoughts and feelings about the federal government in
Washington?" (V06P639)
Half of the sample was randomly assigned to have response options for this question and others
in the Pilot Study read to them in forward order ("extremely conflicting, very conflicting,
moderately conflicting, slightly conflicting, or not conflicting at all"), while the other half heard
the same list presented in reverse order (beginning with "not conflicting at all"). In Table 1, we
see that respondents indicated higher levels of ambivalence when the most conflicting response
options were presented first.
Table 1 about here
The set of questions that forms the basis for our own operative measure of ambivalence is
based on experimental work in social psychology, as adapted for use in large-N surveys (Craig,
Kane, and Martinez 2002). The technique is a version of the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci,
and Tannenbaum 1957), modified by Kaplan (1972) in an effort to show that people's overall
attitudes are made up of both positive and negative elements. In order to separate the two, Kaplan
divided semantic differential scales at the neutral point and asked respondents to indicate both
how positively and how negatively they viewed an attitude object.
Following this model, half of the ANES Pilot Study sample was asked the following
sequence of questions:
"You might have favorable thoughts or feelings about the federal government in
Washington. Or you might have unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the federal
government in Washington. Or you might have some of each. I would like to ask
you first about any favorable thoughts and feelings you might have about the
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federal government in Washington. Then in a moment, I'll ask you some separate
questions about any unfavorable thoughts and feelings you might have."
•

"First, do you have ANY favorable thoughts or feelings about the federal
government in Washington, or do you NOT have any?" (V06P635)

•

(If yes) "How favorable are your favorable thoughts and feelings about the
federal government in Washington?" (V06P636)

•

"Do you have ANY unfavorable thoughts or feelings about the federal
government in Washington, or do you NOT have any?" (V06P637)

•

(If yes) "How unfavorable are your unfavorable thoughts and feelings
about the federal government in Washington?" (V06P638)

Respondents who were selected for the forward response options in the meta-ambivalence
question also were presented with forward response options to both V06P636 ("extremely
favorable, very favorable, moderately favorable, or slightly favorable") and V06P638 ("extremely
unfavorable, very unfavorable, moderately unfavorable, or slightly unfavorable"). Everyone else
was given the reverse options to those questions ("slightly favorable" presented first in V06P636,
"slightly unfavorable" in V06P638). According to the results in Table 2, there were no significant
order effects evident on any of these questions.
Table 2 about here
Based on people's answers to the four operative measures, we calculated an ambivalence
score using an algorithm developed by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995):
Operative Ambivalence = [(P + N)/2] - |P - N|
where P is the positive (favorable) reaction score and N is the negative (unfavorable) reaction
score. Scores for each item range from –2.0 ("extremely" positive and no negative thoughts or

9
feelings, or "extremely" negative and no positive) to +4.0 ("extremely" positive and negative
thoughts or feelings for the same statement; see Craig, Kane, and Martinez 2002: 291-92). The
mean operative ambivalence score for those presented with the forward response options
("extremely favorable" and "extremely unfavorable") first was .165, and the mean for the reverseoption group was -.041; this difference is statistically trivial (t = 1.430, p = .154).
A second operative measure of ambivalence about the federal government was derived
from a pair of open-ended questions posed to the half-sample of respondents who were not asked
for their separate favorable/unfavorable thoughts and feelings. The questions were as follows:
"Is there anything in particular that you like about the federal government in
Washington? What is that?" (V06P640)
"Is there anything in particular that you dislike about the federal government in
Washington? What is that?" (V06P642)
Respondents were invited to offer as many likes and dislikes as they wanted, though most were
fairly terse in their answers to these questions. Roughly six in ten (62.5%) said that there was
nothing they liked about the government in Washington, while the median respondent articulated
a single dislike. A few were more loquacious: one person offered six likes, and eight respondents
reported six or more dislikes (one actually reported ten). Using the same algorithm as employed
with the favorable/unfavorable evaluations described above, we calculated a second operative
ambivalence score based on the number of likes and dislikes (V06P641 and V06P643,
respectively) provided by each respondent, recoding the maximum number of likes or dislikes to
five in order to reduce the impact of outlying responses (cf. Basinger and Lavine 2005; Lavine
and Steenbergen 2005). Figure 1 shows that the distributions of both operative ambivalence
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measures are centered at zero, though the measure based on likes/dislikes is somewhat more
peaked than the one based on favorable/unfavorable thoughts and feelings.
Figure 1 about here
In sum, all 675 Pilot Study respondents were asked the meta-ambivalence question, half
were asked the operative favorable/unfavorable questions, and the other half were asked the
operative likes/dislikes questions. Each half-sample was further divided into groups that were
asked either the meta-ambivalence question prior to the operative questions, or the operative
questions prior to the meta-ambivalence question. Finally, those groups were split again, with
some people receiving the forward response options on the meta-ambivalence and operative
favorable/unfavorable questions, and others receiving the reverse options as shown in Table 3.
Table 3 about here
Analysis of Ambivalence Measures
Question-Order and Response-Order Effects
Results show that scores on the subjective (meta-ambivalence) measure were susceptible
to both question-order and response-order effects. Respondents who answered meta-ambivalence
and the operative favorable/unfavorable questions reported higher levels of internal conflict when
the former was asked first (respective means of 2.962 and 2.522, t = 3.624, p < .001); similarly,
those who answered meta-ambivalence in combination with the likes/dislikes reported higher
conflict when presented with the subjective measure first (respective means of 3.086 and 2.710, t
= 3.344, p = .001). It thus appears that respondents' subjective assessments of internal conflict are
somehow dampened when they are initially asked to express their favorable and unfavorable
thoughts, or their likes and dislikes, regarding the federal government. That is, when confronted
with the operative questions first, some people conclude that they are not as conflicted as they
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might otherwise have believed to be the case (see Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1984). In
contrast, the effects of question order on respondents' operative ambivalence scores are not
statistically significant; those who were asked the meta-ambivalence questions first had slightly
higher mean scores on the operative measures (.162 to -.035 on the favorable/unfavorable
measure, -.028 to -.096 on the likes/dislikes measure), but those differences could be attributable
to sampling (t = 1.367, p = .173 on the former, t = 0.717, p = .474 on the latter).
There also is a significant interaction effect of response order and question order on
individuals' meta-ambivalence scores. As noted earlier (see Table 1), respondents who heard the
"extremely conflicting, very conflicting . . ." response options first reported, on average, a higher
level of internal conflict than those who were presented with the reverse sequence (beginning
with "not conflicting at all"; F = 11.17, df = 1, p < 0.001). As shown in Table 4, this effect is
especially pronounced among those who answered the meta-ambivalence question following the
operative favorable/unfavorable items (F on the interaction term = 2.920, df = 3, p = 0.033). In
contrast, the analysis of variance results portrayed in the middle and rightmost columns of the
table indicates that neither operative measure of ambivalence was significantly affected by
question order (F = 1.19, df = 1, p = .276 for favorable/unfavorable; F = 0.58, df = 1, p = .445 for
likes/dislikes), response order in the meta-ambivalence question (F = 1.29, df = 1, p = .257 for
favorable/unfavorable; F = 0.40, df = 1, p = .547 for likes/dislikes), or their interaction (F = 1.52,
df = 1, p = .218 for favorable/unfavorable; F = 0.56, df = 1, p = 0.417 for likes/dislikes).
Table 4 about here
In sum, the meta-ambivalence item appears to be more malleable and context-dependent
than either of the operative measures. This suggests that the latter may be more valid indicators
of ambivalence.
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Ambivalence and Attitude Stability
An examination of their relationships with attitude stability (Craig, Martinez, and Kane
2005; Armitage and Connor 2000; Bassili 1996) permits us to assess the construct validity of the
various subjective and operative ambivalence measures. Specifically, we expect that people who
are most ambivalent will exhibit less stable attitudes about the federal government over time. The
design of the 2006 ANES Pilot Study provides a test of that proposition. All respondents in the
Pilot Study had also participated in the traditional 2004 ANES survey, and are thus part of a twoyear panel. As in the past, the 2004 ANES included the question,
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington
to do what is right – just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?
(V045197)
as part of a four-item battery designed to measure trust in government.
In 2006, the Pilot Study posed three versions this question. One group of 219 respondents
was given the standard wording (V06P654), thereby allowing us to observe directly the stability
of trust over a two-year period. Another group (N = 238) was asked how much of the time
("always, most of the time, about half the time, once in awhile, or never") they felt the
government in Washington could be trusted to "make decisions in a fair way" (V06P656) and "do
what is best for the country." (V06P658) A third group (N = 218) was asked what percentage of
the time they felt the government in Washington could be trusted to "make decisions in a fair
6

way" (V06P660) and "do what is best for the country." (V06P662) The correlation between "fair
decisions" and "do what is best" is high in the second (taub = .513, p < .001) and third groups
(taub = .694, p < .001), so in each instance these items were combined into an index. Once again,
we anticipate that less ambivalent respondents will exhibit greater stability from 2004 to 2006 on
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the standard trust question, and higher over-time correlations between standard trust in 2004 and
the experimental trust questions in 2006.
Table 5 shows that this expectation is modestly supported with the meta-ambivalence
measure: Respondents who reported less internal conflict in their thoughts and feelings about the
federal government were indeed more stable in their answers to the standard trust question than
were those who indicated greater conflict. The over-time taub correlation for that item was .352
among individuals with low subjective ambivalence ("not at all" or "slightly" conflicting),
compared with a trivial .142 for the highly ambivalent ("very" or "extremely" conflicting). With
regard to the relationship between old and new measures of trust, the evidence is mixed: As we
expected, the correlation between 2004 trust and the "how often best and fair" index in 2006 is
highest (taub = .466) among respondents who felt the least conflicted. In contrast, the correlation
between 2004 trust and the "percentage best and fair" index in 2006 is strongest (taub = .508) for
the high-ambivalence group.
Table 5 about here
Results for the operative favorable/unfavorable measure are somewhat inconsistent as
well. On the one hand, people who were more ambivalent (scores of zero and above) based on
separate favorable/unfavorable evaluations actually have slightly higher over-time correlations
(taub = .384) on the trust-Washington item than did those who exhibited less ambivalence (.320).
More in line with our hypothesis, however, correlations between 2004 trust and the two new
2006 indices are substantially higher (.342 for "how often best and fair", .616 for "percentage
best and fair") among those with low scores on operative ambivalence (compared with .280 and
.196, respectively, for everyone else).
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The operative likes/dislikes measure did not fare as well on this test, with correlations
between the 2004 trust-Washington item and all three 2006 trust questions being slightly higher
among those with greater ambivalence (scores of zero and above). Overall, then, evidence of a
moderating effect on attitude stability is mixed for both meta-ambivalence and the favorable/
unfavorable measure, and is non-existent for likes/dislikes.
Ambivalence, Trust, and Vote Choice
Our next test of construct validity is based on the premise that ambivalence moderates not
only over-time stability, but also the relationship between attitudes and actual or intended
behavior (Sparks, Harris, and Lockwood 2004). If we consider ambivalence about the federal
government to be an attribute of the attitude of political trust, we would expect that high levels of
ambivalence would moderate any relationships between trust and behavior. One intended
behavior that is theoretically related to trust is vote choice, with greater cynicism increasing the
likelihood of support for out-party candidates in two-candidate races and third-party candidates in
three-way races (Hetherington 1999). Respondents in the 2006 Pilot Study were asked to imagine
this interesting scenario:
"Suppose that an election were being held today that would determine who the
President of the United States is for the next four years. And imagine that the only
candidates allowed to run in that election were Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
And imagine that you voted in that election. Who would you vote for: Bill Clinton
or George W. Bush?"7 (V06P774)
If trust at least partially reflects some assessment of the incumbent administration, as
Hetherington (1999) suggests, we might expect that the trusting will be more likely to support
Bush over his predecessor in this hypothetical horserace. That expectation is borne out in our
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estimate of a logit model reported in Table 6 Model 1. Political trust (as measured with the "trust
Washington to do what is right" item asked of 219 respondents in the 2006 Pilot Study) has a
significant positive effect on the likelihood of supporting Bush, controlling for 2004 partisanship
and 2006 response-order effects (see note 7). The overall impact of trust in this model is quite
stunning; for example, the average probability of a Bush "vote" by a pure independent (who was
offered the Bush response first) increases from 21.9% for someone who trusts the government in
Washington "only some of the time" to 40.0% for someone who trusts Washington "most of the
time."
Table 6 about here
In Table 6 Model 2, we add the subjective ambivalence term and its interaction with trust.
If ambivalence moderates the effect of trust on voter choice, we would expect to see a significant
negative coefficient for the interaction term, which would indicate that the effect of trust on voter
choice diminishes as ambivalence increases. However, our estimates here provide no evidence of
a moderating effect for the meta-ambivalence measure. In this specification, the main effect of
trust switches signs and loses significance, and neither the main effect of meta-ambivalence nor
the interaction term have significant effects on the hypothetical vote choice (p > .10 for both).
The moderation prediction also does not pan out in Model 3, which includes the
favorable/unfavorable operative ambivalence measure and its interaction with trust. Despite the
loss of cases (mainly due to only half the sample being asked this set of operative ambivalence
questions), the main effect of trust remains positive and significant (p < .08) controlling for both
operative ambivalence and the interaction term. The main effect of operative ambivalence is
negative (anti-Bush), but not significant. More importantly, the interaction term is positive
(contrary to our expectations) and statistically not discernible from zero. In sum, we see no
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evidence that the favorable/unfavorable operative ambivalence moderates the effect of
ambivalence on vote choice.
Model 4 includes the likes/dislikes measure as well as the interaction of that variable with
political trust. In this estimation, the main effect of operative ambivalence is negative (anti-Bush)
and significant, while the main effect of trust switches signs and loses significance (the negative
coefficient indicating that among people with a zero score on operative ambivalence, trust is
associated with a somewhat lower likelihood of supporting the incumbent). The interaction effect
between ambivalence and trust is positive and significant, which does suggest that the direction
of the relationship between trust and vote choice is conditioned by ambivalence. However, the
negative (and non-significant) main effect of trust was unexpected and inexplicable given our
current understanding of the theoretical relationship between trust and voter choice. Overall, we
do not find strong evidence that ambivalence moderates the pro-incumbent effects of trust on
voter choice, with either meta-ambivalence or the operative ambivalence measures.
Ambivalence and Political Interest
Prior research on how ambivalence shapes political information processing suggests an
examination of the relationship between ambivalence and political interest. Our definition of
ambivalence might lead us to expect that the relationship would be a positive one; after all, in
order to simultaneously hold conflicting evaluations of the same attitude object, one must have at
least two thoughts (one positive and one negative) about the object. An increasing number of
thoughts in a domain increases the probability that some of those thoughts will have opposite
valences, thereby leading to greater ambivalence. If our logic here is correct, it seems reasonable
to predict that there will be a positive correlation between interest and ambivalence.
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It is possible, however, that ambivalence operates as an independent rather than a
dependent variable in this relationship. Returning to the distinction between potential
ambivalence (when conflicting attitudes coexist) and felt ambivalence (when that conflict is
accessible in memory and produces cognitive discomfort; see note 3), scholars disagree about the
likely consequences of the latter. Some argue, for example, that the dissonance associated with
felt ambivalence should motivate information seeking and systematic information processing in
an attempt to resolve the ambivalence (Meffert, Guge, and Lodge 2000; McGraw and Bartels
2005). But others maintain that meta-ambivalence is negatively associated with domain-specific
interest due to people's efforts to avoid the psychological discomfort associated with ambivalence
(Holbrook and Krosnick 2005).
In Table 7, we report the correlations between ambivalence and various measures of
political interest included in both the Pilot Study and the 2004 pre-post election study. In general,
meta-ambivalence is positively but weakly correlated with most measures of political interest (the
exception being "how often R pays attention" in 2006). The correlations between political interest
and operative ambivalence based on likes/dislikes are also mostly positive though even weaker
than those for meta-ambivalence, while operative ambivalence based on favorable/unfavorable
evaluations is statistically unrelated to political interest.
Table 7 about here
Ambivalence and Partisanship
Political campaigns often serve to highlight the different conceptions that our two major
parties have about the role that government should play in regulating citizens' economic, social,
and moral behavior. Although one might normally expect that strong partisans on both sides
would experience less ambivalence regarding the federal government, the limited evidence we
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have on that topic is inconsistent. McGraw and Bartels (2005), for example, found that partisan
strength was positively associated with ambivalence about Congress, but not with ambivalence
about President Clinton or the Supreme Court. Citrin and Luks (2005), on the other hand,
reported that independents were somewhat less emotionally ambivalent about America than
either Republicans or Democrats, and that ideological moderates were less ambivalent than
liberals or conservatives.
Results in Table 8 show that ambivalence about the federal government (using either
meta-ambivalence or the operative measures) is essentially unrelated to strength of partisanship
or ideological extremity in 2004-06. The few statistically significant relationships that we
observe suggest a mild positive relationship between ambivalence and partisan strength, but are
very weak in magnitude (taub < .13). Moreover, ambivalence is not associated with an increased
likelihood of preference for divided over unified government (as measured in 2004).
Table 8 about here
Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we examined the validity of one subjective and two operative measures of
ambivalence about the federal government. Our first test considered whether these indicators
were susceptible to context effects stemming from variations in question order and responseoption order in the 2006 ANES Pilot Study survey. Although we found no significant effects for
the operative measures, meta-ambivalence proved to be quite sensitive to both types of
variations. That is, respondents reported experiencing less internal conflict (a) when low-conflict
response options preceded high-conflict options; and (b) after first being asked either to verbalize
their likes and dislikes about the federal government, or to provide separate favorable and
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unfavorable evaluations. The relative malleability of the meta-ambivalence measure would seem
to raise serious doubts about its validity.
Further tests of construct validity were less conclusive. Prior research has established that
ambivalence fosters attitude instability, and that it sometimes moderates the relationship between
attitudes and other attitudes or behavior (actual or intended). Accordingly, we anticipated that
people with lower levels of ambivalence would exhibit greater two-year stability on a standard
ANES political trust item, as well as higher correlations between that item in 2004 and new
measures of trust asked in the Pilot Study two years later. However, while meta-ambivalence was
predictably related to the over-time (in)stability of traditional trust, correlations between old and
new measures were, in one instance, actually highest among the most subjectively ambivalent.
The measures of operative ambivalence fared little better: Correlations between old and new trust
questions were indeed lower among the most ambivalent respondents (based on favorable/
unfavorable evaluations), but those same individuals exhibited slightly higher two-year stability
for "trust Washington to do what is right." Respondents who scored relatively high on likes/
dislikes operative ambivalence also showed slightly higher over-time stability on measures of
trust. Neither meta-ambivalence nor the operative measures reliably moderated the relationship
between trust and support for President Bush in a hypothetical matchup with former President
Clinton. Taken together, the results of our various construct validity tests are not very
encouraging for researchers eager to include either subjective or operative measures of
8

ambivalence in omnibus surveys; in addition, they raise serious concerns about the relatively
high susceptibility of the meta-ambivalence measure to survey context.
Nevertheless, we wish to offer a caveat based on our finding that the subjective measure
of ambivalence was positively related to political interest, while the operative measure was not.
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That result is consistent with research suggesting that the two approaches are not measuring the
same thing, but instead tap different concepts. Felt ambivalence is, by definition, subjective,
which may explain why no one to our knowledge has developed an operative measure of it for
use in either experimental or survey contexts. Similarly, potential ambivalence is conceptually
non-subjective, and thus always measured operatively. To the degree that researchers are
interested in the causes or effects of felt ambivalence, they have no choice but to rely on some
subjective measure, though our concerns about the validity of this particular subjective measure
(as applied to this attitude object) suggest some degree of caution.
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Notes
1. Much of that research is reviewed in Craig and Martinez (2005a, 2005b).
2. We agree with those who maintain that conflict between idea elements (as opposed, for
example, to the more general "opposing considerations" described by Zaller and Feldman) is a
necessary and defining characteristic of ambivalence (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Craig, Kane, and
Martinez 2002).
3. Some scholars believe that operative and subjective measures may tap fundamentally
different concepts. Newby-Clark, MacGregor, and Zanna (2002, 2005), for example, distinguish
between "potential" ambivalence, referring to the existence of concurrent and conflicting
attitudes, and "felt" ambivalence, defined as the simultaneous accessibility of those conflicting
attitudes in working memory. In other words, the presence of attitude conflict, which might be
best measured operatively, is necessary but not always sufficient to produce felt ambivalence,
which might be best measured subjectively (Holbrook and Krosnick 2005).
4. The relationship between subjective and operative measures of ambivalence does not
appear to be as strong as one might expect. For example, when Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin
(1995; also see Mulligan 2007) compared subjects' operative scores with their personal
assessments regarding feelings of conflict (i.e., "I find myself feeling 'torn' between two sides of
the issue of euthanasia"), they found only moderate correlations (not exceeding .40) between the
two. Based on similar results, Priester and Petty (2001: 29) concluded that operative measures
"account for only a moderate amount of the variance associated with the reported psychological
experience of ambivalence."
5. The Pilot Study sample of 675 respondents was drawn from the 1211 individuals who
participated in the 2004 American National Election Study post-election survey. Interviews were
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conducted by telephone from November 13, 2006 through January 7, 2007. All analyses reported
here, except for the logit results in Table 6, were weighted using the 2006 Pilot Study weight
variable. The Pilot Study was supported by the National Science Foundation under grants SES0535332 and SES-0535334, Stanford University, and the University of Michigan; more information is available at http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2006pilot/2006pilot.htm. Our
opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of the
NES staff or funding organizations.
6. Pilot study respondents were also asked about their trust in state governments with
versions of the standard and experimental trust questions. Because the focus of the ambivalence
measures was on the government in Washington, we did not examine the items measuring trust in
the states.
7. Half of the respondents were asked the hypothetical horserace question with Bush's
name first.
8. We hasten to add that "the federal government in Washington" (as opposed to
something less amorphous such as "President Bush" or "it should be possible for a pregnant
woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the
pregnancy") may not be the attitude object most conducive to producing the hypothesized results.
9. Along the same lines, our analysis shows that political trust (as measured with either
the traditional ANES item or the two new measures introduced in 2006) is positively correlated
with meta-ambivalence, but negatively correlated with operative ambivalence.
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Figure 1: Distributions of Two Measures of Operative Ambivalence
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Table 1
Effect of Response-Order on Meta-Ambivalence

Not conflicting at all
Slightly conflicting
Moderately conflicting
Very conflicting
Extremely conflicting

Forward
(beginning with
“Extremely conflicting”)
11.7%
19.3%
37.7%
22.0%
9.3%

Reversed
(beginning with
“Not conflicting at all”)
13.9%
31.2%
35.9%
14.2%
4.7%

Total
12.9%
25.3%
36.8%
18.1%
7.0%

332

337

669

Number of cases

Tau b
significance

None
Slightly
Moderately
Very
Extremely

-0.143
0.000
Table 2
Effect of Response-Order on Favorable and Unfavorable Thoughts
Favorable thoughts
Unfavorable thoughts
Forward Reversed Total
Forward Reversed Total
45.1%
47.9% 46.5%
32.9%
33.7% 33.3%
6.8%
11.5%
9.2%
9.1%
12.0% 10.6%
36.4%
32.1% 34.3%
22.6%
24.1% 23.3%
11.1%
7.3%
9.2%
17.1%
18.7% 17.9%
0.6%
1.2%
0.9%
18.3%
11.4% 14.8%

Number of cases
Tau b
significance

162
-0.054
0.295

165

327

164
-0.049
0.329

165

329
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Table 3
Distribution of Respondents in Response-order and Question order conditions
Response Order
Question Order
Forward
Reverse
Total
Meta first, then operative favorable/unfavorable
96
61
157
Operative likes/dislikes first, then meta
77
103
180
Operative favorable/unfavorable first, then meta
81
100
181
Meta first, then operative likes/dislikes
89
68
157
Total
343
332
675
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Table 4
Effects of Response Order and Question Order on Ambivalence measures
Meta-ambivalence
Forward Reverse
Question Order
Op (fav/unfav) first, then meta
Op (likes/dislikes) first, then meta
Meta first, then op (fav/unfav)
Meta first, then op (likes/dislikes)

2.95
2.80
2.97
3.19

Operative (fav/unfav)
Forward Reverse

2.25
2.63
2.94
2.97

0.18
NA
0.16
NA

-0.17
NA
0.17
NA

Operative (likes/dislikes)
Forward Reverse
NA
-0.17
NA
-0.02

NA
-0.03
NA
-0.04

Entries are mean ambivalence scores for each question-order and response-order category.
F-test
Question-order effects
Response-order effects
Interaction

F
6.87
11.17
2.92

df
3
1
3

sig
0.000
0.001
0.033

F
1.19
1.29
1.52

df
1
1
1

sig
0.276
0.257
0.218

F
0.58
0.40
0.56

df
1
1
1

sig
0.445
0.527
0.417
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Table 5
Taub correlations between 2004 Trust DC to do what is right and 2006 Pilot Measures of Trust
Meta-ambivalence
Low
Medium
High
All Respondents
Trust DC to do what is right
0.142
0.304
0.352
0.240
(212)
(85)
(68)
(59)
Trust DC best and fair
summed
- (category resp.)

0.364
(228)

0.466
(81)

0.306
(96)

0.306
(49)

Trust DC best and fair
summed
- (percent resp.)

0.464
(204)

0.397
(79)

0.436
(68)

0.508
(55)

Trust DC to do what is right

Operative (fav/unfav)
≥0
<0
0.320
0.384
(37)
(68)

Operative (likes/dislikes)
<0
≥0
0.220
0.237
(37)
(69)

Trust DC best and fair
summed
- (category resp.)

0.342
(35)

0.280
(67)

0.380
(59)

0.412
(66)

Trust DC best and fair
summed
- (percent resp.)

0.616
(50)

0.196
(58)

0.446
(36)

0.567
(60)

Entries are taub coefficients between Trust DC (2004 post) and 2006 pilot measure by level of
ambivalence
Number of cases are in parentheses
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Table 6
Logit Model Estimates of Hypothetical Vote Choice (Bush = 1, Clinton = 0)
Model 1
Model 2
Coeff.
s.e.
sig.
Coeff.
s.e.
Text Order: Bush first
-0.869 0.384 0.023
-0.865 0.394
Party ID 2004
0.850 0.112 0.000
0.859 0.114
Trust DC 2006
0.781 0.396 0.048
-0.528 1.085
Meta-ambivalence
-1.314 0.970
Meta-ambivalence by Trust DC 2006
0.523 0.425
Constant
-4.515 1.041 0.000
-1.166 2.592
Number of Cases
-2 log likelihood
Nagelkerke R2

Text Order: Bush first
Party ID 2004
Trust DC 2006
Operative ambivalence (fav/unfav)
Operative ambivalence (likes/dislikes)
Op Ambiv by Trust DC 2006
Constant
Number of Cases
-2 log likelihood
Nagelkerke R2

208
177.420
0.542
Model 3
s.e.
Coeff.
-0.436 0.583
0.983 0.188
1.180 0.666
-0.667 1.302

208
175.284
0.550

sig.
0.455
0.000
0.076
0.609

0.463 0.589 0.431
-6.646 1.936 0.001
105
76.104
0.621

sig.
0.028
0.000
0.627
0.176
0.218
0.653

Model 4
Coeff.
s.e.
sig.
-1.100 0.605 0.069
1.005 0.205 0.000
-1.438 0.921 0.118
-10.267 3.968 0.010
5.071 1.911 0.008
-0.062 1.939 0.974
102
73.815
0.646
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Table 7
Correlations between Measures of Interest and Ambivalence
Operative
Operative
fav/unfav
likes/dislikes
Meta-ambivalence
Interest in information
-0.014
0.127
0.202
- 2006 pilot
(175)
(168)
(340)
How closely pay attention
- 2006 pilot

-0.057
(176)

0.114
(168)

0.181
(341)

How often pay attention
- 2006 pilot

-0.070
(176)

-0.027
(168)

0.078
(341)

Attention to campaigns
- 2006 pilot

-0.102
(156)

0.089
(175)

0.167
(333)

Follow govt and public affairs
- 2006 pilot

-0.044
(156)

0.158
(175)

0.218
(333)

Interest in following campaigns
- 2004 Pre

-0.035
(332)

0.092
(343)

0.132
(674)

Interested in political campaigns
- 2004 Post

0.001
(315)

0.139
(329)

0.172
(643)

Did R vote in 2004?
- 2004 Post

-0.033
(315)

0.102
(329)

0.108
(643)

Entries are taub coefficients (Bold indicates p < .05)
Numbers of cases are in parentheses.

30
Table 8
Correlations between Partisan/Ideological Strength,
Preference for Divided Government, and Ambivalence
Operative
Operative
fav/unfav
likes/dislikes
Party id Strength (Gen Speaking)
-0.030
0.003
- 2006 Pilot
(154)
(171)

Meta-ambivalence
0.129
(324)

Party id Strength (As of today)
- 2006 Pilot

-0.005
(175)

0.075
(168)

-0.022
(343)

Party id Strength (Gen Speaking)
- 2004 Pre

-0.015
(327)

0.100
(340)

0.066
(666)

Ideological Strength
- 2004 Post

0.029
(252)

0.120
(284)

-0.039
(536)

Preference for Divided Govt
- 2004 Pre

-0.052
(325)

-0.044
(332)

0.061
(655)

Entries are taub coefficients (Bold indicates p < .05)
Numbers of cases are in parentheses.
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